The Determinants of Non-bank Financial Institution Efficiency: A Stochastic Cost Frontier Approach by Worthington, Andrew
 1
Copyright 1998 Taylor & Francis 
This is the author-manuscript version of this paper. First published in: 
Worthington, Andrew (1998) The determinants of non-bank financial 
institution efficiency: A stochastic cost frontier approach. Applied Financial 
Economics 8(3):pp. 279-289. 
The determinants of non-bank financial institution efficiency: 
A stochastic cost frontier approach 
ANDREW C. WORTHINGTON 
School of Economics and Finance 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane QLD 4000,  Australia. 
A two-stage estimation procedure is employed to evaluate non-bank financial institution 
efficiency. In the first stage, maximum-likelihood estimates of an econometric cost function are 
obtained for a cross-section of one hundred and fifty Australian credit unions. The results indicate 
that a typical credit union’s costs in 1995 were only some seven percent above what could be 
considered efficient. The second stage uses limited dependent variable regression techniques to 
relate credit union efficiency scores to structural and institutional considerations. The results 
indicate that non-core commercial activities are not a significant influence on the level of cost 
inefficiency, though asset size, capital adequacy regulation, and branch and agency networks are. 
A primary influence on credit union efficiency would appear to be the industrial or community 
associational bond under which they were created, and to a lesser extent the state-based regulatory 
framework. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent survey article Berger et al. (1993, p. 221) argued that “in a world in which the structures 
of financial services industries are changing rapidly, it is important to determine the cost and 
revenue efficiency of the evolving institutions”. Not only does efficiency have important 
ramifications for the institutions themselves - such as profitability, competitiveness and solvency - 
but also in terms of the demands placed upon regulatory authorities, and ultimately taxpayers, in the 
provision of low risk, financial intermediation (Berger, et al. 1993). However, when examining 
existing research in the area of financial institution efficiency, a number of salient points emerge. 
First, while scale and scope efficiencies have been extensively studied, primarily in the context of 
US financial institutions, “..relatively little attention has been paid to measuring what appears to be 
a much more important source of efficiency differences - X-inefficiencies, or deviations from the 
efficient frontier” (Berger, et al. 1993, p. 222).1 Put differently, differences in management’s ability 
to control costs or promote revenues appears to comprise a far more important source of financial 
institution efficiency than either scale or scope efficiencies (Berger and Humphrey, 1991) [see 
Allen and Rai (1996) for an international assessment)].2 Secondly, even when studies have 
concerned themselves with this area “...nearly all such papers [have] measured X-efficiency for US 
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commercial banks, with less than a handful of papers measuring the efficiency of non-bank 
financial institutions or banks outside the US” (Berger, et al. 1993, p. 222). It is with these 
considerations in mind that the present study was undertaken. 
The selection of Australian credit unions for this purpose is appropriate for a number of reasons. 
First, in spite of a relative decline in importance within the Australian financial services industry, 
credit unions still account for some ten percent of total financial institution assets, and some twelve 
percent of total personal finance lending commitments.3 Moreover, recent changes to the fee 
structure of major commercial banks has seen a flight of deposits to credit unions; if not notable in 
total value, at least so in terms of the number of new deposit accounts.4  
Second, since the 1980s the fortunes of the Australian thrift industry (largely state-regulated 
building societies, credit unions, and friendly societies) has directly reflected the changing federal 
regulatory environment. Whilst the building society sector has been characterised by the 
procurement of banking licences, the credit union industry is largely distinguished by merger 
activity. Moreover, credit unions in Australia have also achieved a high degree of interstate and 
industry-wide cooperation, particularly in relation to automatic teller machines (ATMs) and 
electronic funds transfer at point of sale (EFTPOS).5 The extent to which these modifications have 
affected the institutional and competitive environment of credit unions is as yet unquantified.  
Third, an adequate amount of statistical information is an obvious sine qua non for estimations of 
this type. Fortunately, sets of extensive, comparable and consistent data exist for credit unions; a 
requirement that is somewhat less likely to hold for Australian commercial banks. Fourth, there is 
some degree of correspondence between the position of Australian credit unions and the decline of 
the troubled US savings and loans (S&Ls) industry. In the latter’s case, “the most cited factors 
contributing to this downfall have been interest rate risk, deregulation, and the economic decline of 
specific geographic markets [and] more recently, the possibility of X-inefficiency in the use of 
inputs and outputs has been offered” (Berger et al. 1993, p. 236).6 Given that X-inefficiency has 
been empirically linked to the failure of thrift institutions in the US, there is a compelling case for 
the analysis of these factors in the Australian institutional milieu.7  
Fifth, whilst some attempt has been made to quantify the economies of scale and scope of 
Australian thrifts [see, for instance, Esho and Sharpe (1994)], little attention has been directed to 
the evaluation of cost inefficiencies. Indeed, the need for further research in this area is even more 
pronounced when one considers the lack of thrift-efficiency studies in general (Fried et al. 1993; 
1996). Finally, there is at least anecdotal evidence to suggest that the managerial inputs employed 
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in the credit union industry may not be the equal of those found in the commercial banking sector.8 
If this is the case, then the analysis of efficiency may highlight areas of concern to regulators.9 
The paper itself is divided into four main areas. Section 2 provides a synopsis of the econometric 
techniques used in the analysis of financial institution efficiency. Section 3 deals with the empirical 
methodology employed in the paper, and the results are dealt with in Section 4. The paper ends 
with some brief concluding remarks in Section 5. 
II. THE MEASUREMENT OF COST EFFICIENCY 
The recent history of efficiency measurement begins with Farrell (1957) who defined a simple 
measure of firm efficiency which could account for multiple inputs. In his approach, Farrell (1957) 
proposed that the efficiency of any given firm consisted of two components: technical efficiency, or 
the ability of a firm to maximise output from a given set of inputs, and allocative efficiency, or the 
ability of a firm to use these inputs in optimal proportions, given the respective prices. Combining 
the two measures provides a measure of total or economic efficiency. 
Figure 1. Technical and Allocative Efficiencies 
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The essence of Farrell’s (1957) argument is contained in Figure 1. Here two inputs, x1 and x2, are 
utilised to produce a single output y, under an assumption of constant returns to scale. The isoquant 
of the fully efficient firm SS' permits the measurement of technical efficiency. For a given firm 
using quantities of inputs defined by point P to produce a unit of output, the level of technical 
efficiency may be defined as the ratio OQ/OP, which is the proportional reduction in all inputs that 
could be theoretically achieved without any reduction in output. Point Q, on the other hand, is 
technically efficient since it already lies on the efficient isoquant. If the input price ratio AA' is 
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known, then allocative efficiency at point P is the ratio OR/OQ, where the distance RQ is the 
reduction in production costs which would occur if production occurred at Q' - the allocatively and 
technically efficient point, rather than Q - the technically efficient, but allocatively inefficient point. 
Hence, total economic efficiency is the ratio OR/OP, with the cost reduction achievable being the 
distance RP. 
It is Farrell’s (1957) suggestion that efficiency could be measured in reference to an idealised 
frontier isoquant - or equivalently, disturbances in an econometric model - that forms the basis of 
subsequent empirical analysis [for surveys, see Førsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980), Seiford and 
Thrall (1990), Greene (1993), Lovell (1993), Bauer et al. (1993), and Ali and Seiford (1993)]. 
Within this, at least four different approaches have been employed in the analysis of financial 
institution efficiency, all of which differ in the assumptions placed on the probability distributions 
of the X-efficiency differences and unrelated random errors. These are: (i) the econometric frontier 
approach; (ii) the thick frontier approach; (iii) the distribution-free approach; and (iv) the data 
envelopment analysis or DEA approach. 
First, the econometric frontier approach generally assumes a two-component error structure such 
that the inefficiencies follow an asymmetric half-normal distribution and the random errors are 
normally distributed. Studies by Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Bauer et al. (1993), Esho and Sharpe 
(1996) and Cebenoyan et al. (1993) have used this approach. Second, the thick frontier approach 
posits that deviations from predicted costs within the lowest average-cost quartile of financial 
institutions are the result of random error, whilst differences between the highest and lowest 
average-cost quartile reflect inefficiencies plus exogenous differences in output quantities and input 
prices. Examples of work in this area include Berger and Humphrey (1991) and Bauer et al. (1993). 
Third, supporters of the distribution-free approach argue that efficiency differences are stable over 
time, whilst random errors average out over time. Bauer et al. (1993) and Berger (1993) have 
undertaken work in this area. Finally, the data envelopment analysis approach assumes that all 
deviations from the estimated frontier represent inefficiency. This approach has been applied to 
financial institutions by Elysiani and Mehdian (1990), Miller and Noulas (1996), Drake and 
Weyman-Jones (1996) and Worthington (1996). 
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III. MODELS AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Model selection 
In terms of the estimation technique which follows, a stochastic frontier cost function approach is 
employed. The most notable features of this model are: (i) the estimation of a cost, rather than a 
production function, and (ii) the use of firm-specific variables to identify the sources of cost 
inefficiency. 
Firstly, an alternative dual form - such as a cost or profit function - of the production technology is 
to be preferred for at least two reasons. First, more often than not the explicit assumption of the 
production function approach that input levels are fixed, and that managerial inputs are attempting 
to maximise output, will not hold. In particular, one would expect that for a financial institution, 
such as a credit union, the imposition of capital adequacy requirements would tend to restrict the 
amount of output possible in any one time period. Hence, a suitable behavioural objective for these 
institutions would be that of cost minimisation, rather than output maximisation. Second, credit 
unions are multiple output concerns, encompassing both loans (consumer, property, commercial) 
and investment in financial assets (cash, governmental securities, bank bills and negotiable 
certificates of deposit). The argument for a cost function is enhanced a fortiori, given the necessity 
of integrating multiple financial outputs (Cebenoyan et al. 1993; Mester, 1987, 1993; McKillop and 
Glass, 1994; Piesse and Townsend, 1995). The following model is specified: 
 TCi = βXi + εi i = 1,....,N. (1) 
where TCi is the logarithm of the total cost of production of the i-th firm; Xi is a k×1 vector of input 
prices P and output Q, β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and εi is a disturbance 
term where: 
  εi = (Vi + Ui)  i = 1,....,N. (2) 
As per the earlier discussion, the disturbance is composed of two influences: Vi are random 
variables assumed to be N(0,σv2) and independent of Ui, which are non-negative random variables 
assumed to account for the cost of inefficiency in production and are distributed |N(0, σU2)|. 
The error term is decomposed using the conditional distribution approach proposed by Jondrow et 
al. (1982) for a half-normal distribution; providing an unbiased, though inconsistent, estimate of the 
cost of inefficiency. The measure of cost efficiency relative to the cost frontier is defined as: 
 E[U|ε] = [σλ/(1+λ2)][φ(ελ/σ) /{1-Φ(ελ/σ)} + ελ/σ]  (3) 
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where σ = (σV2 + σU2)1/2 and λ = σU/σV, φ is the standard normal density function, and Φ the 
cumulative normal density function, and all other terms are as previously defined. To obtain 
estimates of (3), maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the stochastic cost frontier (1) 
are first estimated. 
Secondly, not content with merely estimating firm-level efficiencies, many studies have sought to 
identify the sources of said inefficiencies. This has often involved regressing the predicted 
inefficiencies on firm-specific variables, such as managerial inputs, agency issues, and financial 
structure. These usually take the form of either (i) nonparametric, nonstochastic techniques (see, for 
instance, Drake and Weyman-Jones, 1992; Favero and Papi, 1995) or (ii) parametric, stochastic 
techniques (such as Cebenoyan et al. 1993; Mester, 1993) in estimating cost efficiencies; followed 
by  parametric, stochastic techniques to attribute variation in these efficiencies. Given that the 
efficiency measure calculated in equation (3) is a limited dependent variable, such that 0 ≤ Ui, a 
Tobit model takes the generalised form: 
 Yi = δZi + ui i = 1,....,N. (4) 
where Yi is the cost efficiency of the i-th credit union, Zi is a p×1 vector of variables which may 
influence the efficiency of a credit union, and δ is a 1×p vector of parameters to be estimated. 
Finally, in order to estimate the parameters detailed in equation (1), the efficiency measure in (3), 
and the parameters detailed in (4) two further a priori specifications are required. These are: (i) the 
section of a suitable cost function, and (ii) the identification of a vector of variables used to explain 
the differences in predicted efficiencies between firms in an industry. These are detailed in Sections 
3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
3.2 Cost function formulation 
Estimating equation (1) requires the formulation of a suitable cost function, of which the Cobb-
Douglas and translog (transcendental logarithmic) are the most commonly used in stochastic 
frontier analyses. Following Cebenoyan et al. (1993) and Esho and Sharpe (1996) for an X-
efficiency analysis, and Mester (1993), McKillop and Glass (1994) and Esho and Sharpe (1994) for 
scale and scope analyses, a translog cost function is employed. The advantages of this formulation 
are twofold. First, the translog places no a priori restrictions on the elasticity of substitution 
between inputs, and second, economies of scale are not restricted to take the same value across all 
firms. However, the translog suffers a number of deficiencies. Esho and Sharpe (1994, p. 261) 
observe that most of these relate to the estimation of economies of scope and scale. However, 
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problems with the large number of parameters to be estimated also applies to cost efficiency 
estimates. In part, this issue is resolved by the large number of credit unions operating in Australia, 
but it also serves to highlight concerns that might appear if the same procedure is employed with, 
say, Australian commercial banks or building societies. Accordingly, to estimate the cost function 
in equation (1), the following translog cost formulation is specified:  
 lnTC = α0 + ΣilnQi + ΣjβjlnPj + ½ΣiΣkδiklnQilnQk  +  
  ½ΣjΣhγjhlnPjlnPh + ΣiΣjρijlnQilnPj  (5) 
for i,k = 1, . . . , a and j, h = 1, . . . , p where TC = total operating and interest costs, Pj = unit price 
of factor input j, and Qi = quantity of output i.  
The variables used to estimate (5) are detailed in Table 1. All data corresponds to the financial year 
ending 30 June 1995 and is obtained from the Australian Financial Institutions Commission 
(AFIC). The variables apply to a sample of one hundred and fifty credit unions.  
The actual specification of these variables is contingent upon one’s a priori conceptualisation of 
financial institution behaviour, for which two primary approaches exist. The first of these, the 
production approach, conceptualises financial institutions, such as credit unions, as producers of 
loan and deposit accounts. In this instance, outputs are defined as the number of such accounts, or 
their associated transactions, whilst capital and labour expenses, and total operating costs, define  
the firm’s inputs and total costs respectively. The second approach to financial institution behaviour 
is termed the intermediation approach. Here financial institutions are viewed as “...intermediators of 
financial services rather than producers of loan and deposit account services, and the values of loans 
and investments are used as output measures; labour and capital are inputs to this process, hence 
operating costs plus interest costs are the relevant cost measure. Deposits may be either inputs or 
outputs” (Colwell and Davis, 1992, p. 113). In most instances, the intermediation approach is the 
preferred conceptualisation (Colwell and Davis, 1992, p. 113).10 Furthermore, the intermediation 
approach is consistent with both existing commercial bank studies, and specific thrift analyses such 
as Fried et al. (1993). Brief reviews of these conceptualisations, along with several others, may be 
found in Colwell and Davis (1992) and Favero and Papi (1995). 
The five outputs used in the present study follow the thrift analyses of Hardwick (1990), Cebenoyan 
et al. (1993), Drake and Weyman-Jones (1992; 1996) and Piesse and Townsend (1995). They are: 
personal loans and consumer credit facilities Q1; property loans and real estate loans Q2; 
commercial loans Q3; deposits with other thrift institutions and banks Q4; and finally, other 
securities Q5. Total cost TC is measured as total operating plus interest expenses. The three inputs 
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used in the present study are the price of physical capital P1, the price of deposits P2 and the price 
of labour P3.  
TABLE 1. Cost function and explanatory variables 
Cost function variables Explanatory variables 
TC Total cost Operating plus interest expenses of 
the i-th credit union. 
Z1 Assets Total financial and non-
financial assets of the i-th credit 
union. 
Q1 Personal 
loans 
Personal loans and consumer credit 
facilities of the i-th credit union. 
Z2 Capital Total capital divided by total 
assets of the i-th credit union. 
Q2 Property 
loans 
Property and real estate loans held 
by the i-th credit union. 
Z3 Commercial Total commercial loans held 
divided by total assets of the i-
th credit union. 
Q3 Commercial 
loans 
Commercial loans held by the i-th 
credit union. 
Z4 Fee Total fee and commission 
income divided by total income 
of the i-th credit union. 
Q4 Deposit 
securities 
Current and term commercial bank 
deposits of the i-th credit union. 
Z5 Branch Number of branches operated 
by the i-th credit union. 
Q5 Other 
securities 
All other financial investments, 
including bank bills, negotiable 
certificates of deposit, 
Commonwealth/State/Local and 
Semi-Government securities, etc. of 
the i-th credit union. 
Z6 Agency Number of agencies operated 
by the i-th credit union. 
P1 Price of 
physical 
capital 
Sum of physical capital 
expenditures (office and equipment 
expenses, etc.) divided by the book 
value of net total office premises 
and equipment (including office 
buildings and land, leasehold 
improvements, furniture and 
fixtures, capitalised leases) of the i-
th credit union. 
Z7 Industrial Qualitative variable if the i-th 
credit union established via 
industrial bond. 
P2 Price of 
deposits 
Total interest expense divided by 
total deposits and other borrowings 
of the i-th credit union. 
Z8 Community Qualitative variable if the i-th 
credit union established via 
community bond. 
P3 Price of 
labour 
Total expenditures on employees 
divided by the number of full-time 
equivalent employees of the i-th 
credit union. 
Z9-Z15 NSW, VIC, 
QLD, SA, 
WA, TAS, 
and NT. 
Qualitative variable if the i-th 
credit union established in New 
South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, South Australia, 
Western Australia, Tasmania, 
and Northern Territory. 
 
Finally, (5) is reformulated to impose the standard symmetry and linear homogeneity input price 
restrictions following Cebenoyan et al. (1993) and Goldberg and Rai (1996). The reformulated 
translog cost function is detailed below: 
 lnTC* = α0 + ΣilnQi + ΣjβjlnPj* + ½ΣiΣkδiklnQilnQk +     
  ½ΣjΣhγjhlnPj*lnPh* + ΣiΣjρijlnQilnPj* (6) 
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where I, k = 1, . . . a and j, h = 1, . . . p - 1, and TC* = TC/Pp, Pj* = Pj/Pp, and Ph* = Ph/Pp. 
3.3 Explanatory variables 
The second part of the two-stage estimation procedure involves the specification of a vector of 
explanatory variables presumed to account for cost inefficiency, as detailed in equation (4). These 
are intended to evaluate four associated hypotheses on the relationship between financial institution 
inefficiency and firm-specific variables. The sets of variables selected relate to the firm’s (i) 
operational characteristics, (ii) organisational structure, and (iii) institutional or environmental 
framework. These variables are detailed in Table 1. 
The first group of explanatory variables relate to firm-specific operational characteristics. The first 
variable, total assets Z1, is intended to control for the overall size of a credit union (Hardwick, 1990; 
Drake and Weyman-Jones, 1992; Mester, 1993; Cebenoyan et al. 1993). It may be argued that 
larger credit unions direct more managerial inputs into identifying and resolving inefficiency; ex 
ante one would expect a negative coefficient when cost inefficiency is regressed against total assets. 
The second explanatory variable included is the firm’s capital to asset ratio Z2. All other things 
being equal, “moral hazard theory suggests [the capital asset ratio] should be inversely related to 
inefficiency” (Mester, 1993, p. 282). Third, the extent of non-core lending activity is proxied by the 
level of commercial loan activity Z3. The hypothesis here is that exposure to non-core loan activity 
may serve to “impose market discipline” (Mester, 1993, p. 282) on credit union managers - thus a 
negative coefficient is hypothesised. Finally, a further aspect of diversified credit union revenue 
behaviour is proxied by the level of income obtained through fees and commissions Z4. Given the 
fact that their underlying commitments may not be related to specific balance sheet magnitudes, it is 
somewhat difficult to postulate the relationship between these revenue sources and firm efficiency. 
However, all other things being equal, an identical coefficient to commercial loans is hypothesised. 
At the very least, the results should shed some light on the impact of these ‘off-balance sheet’ 
activities on firm efficiency.  
The second group of explanatory variables relate to the branching behaviour of credit unions, 
generating three somewhat conflicting hypotheses (Fried et al. 1993). The first is that under the 
intermediation approach, branches Z5 and agencies Z6 are recognised as “...central to the 
intermediation process for most [non-bank financial institutions], it may also be the case that 
differences in the intensity of branching may be an important factor” (Drake and Weyman-Jones, 
1992, p. 5). Accordingly, the number of branches are closely related to the level of financial 
intermediation provided - and a negative coefficient is inferred. The second hypothesis is that the 
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number of branches and agencies are a critical, and possibly negative factor, in the ability of head 
offices to promote cost efficient behaviour. In this case, we would expect a positive coefficient 
ceteris paribus. The third hypothesis is that branch services are an output offered jointly with 
deposit services; a positive coefficient is thus postulated. Of course, the impact of low cost, low 
productivity agencies is expected to contrast markedly with that of a full-service branch network.11 
Finally, a group of explanatory variables are included in order to proxy the disparate institutional 
environments under which Australian credit unions operate (Fried et al. 1993; Cebenoyan et al. 
1993). The first of these relate to the specific bond-type under which the credit union exists, either 
industrial Z7 or community-based Z8. At first impression, we would expect that ceteris paribus 
industrial-bond credit unions should exhibit cost advantages as a result of sponsor-institutionally 
donated resources; usually in the form of employee compensation and benefits, office occupancy 
expenses, and office operations expense (Fried et al. 1993, p. 256). However, a number of 
conflicting issues may also arise. First, over time we would expect that the limited potential 
membership pool of these industrial credit unions would tend to impact upon the efficient operation 
of the financial institution itself. And second, as membership grows in the unconstrained 
community-based organisations we would expect that the social and philosophical basis upon which 
it may have been founded would give way to a market-orientation (O’Brien 1993). The presumption 
here is that any cost advantages posed by donated resources would soon be outweighed by the 
limits placed upon membership. In part, evidence of such a hypothesis may be indicated by the 
level of merger activity found in industrial-bond credit unions. 
The last six explanatory variables Z9 - Z15 relate to the state-based legislation under which credit 
unions operate (Mester, 1993; Fried et al. 1993; Cebenoyan et al. 1993; Favero and Papi, 1995). In 
support of this approach, Saunders (1993, p. 552) argues inter alia: 
[I]f we are to believe these studies, cost ‘X-inefficiencies’ range anywhere between 
10% and 30%. Of course one feels uncomfortable with such a large cost inefficiency 
that is as yet unattributed. However, one suspects that is regulation, and the institutional 
structure produced by regulation, that may be the culprit. 
Whilst moves have been made to formulate a national framework of supervision, one would expect 
that the vast quantum of inherited state-based regulatory differences would remain. To some extent, 
the uneven development of thrift institutions and their competitors in Australia, and the 
demographic profiles of the states themselves, would also have some impact. The coefficient would 
therefore necessarily depend on the relative impact of regulation, and the impact of institutional and 
structural considerations, amongst other factors. No a priori coefficient is postulated. 
 11
IV. RESULTS 
The results for the normalised translog cost function detailed in equation (6) are found in Table 2. 
Also included are the parameters σ2U, σ2V, and λ associated with the variances of the random 
variables Vi and Ui. A chi-square statistic using these parameters is used to reject the null 
hypothesis of the absence of the stochastic effects, and therefore the possibility that a standard 
regression could have been used to estimate the model. The cost efficiency estimates derived from 
(3) range from 0.0498 to 0.1211 with a mean efficiency level of 0.07794 and a standard deviation of 
0.0145. In economic terms these measures indicate how far above the cost frontier a credit union is 
operating. The suggestion is that a typical credit union in 1995 produced its products at a cost that 
was approximately seven percent greater than necessary, with overall cost inefficiencies ranging 
from five percent to over twelve percent. A narrow band of operational characteristics was 
encountered, suggesting that the move to a federally-supervised regulatory regime, and the high 
level of merger activity, has created a remarkably homogeneous industrial sector. Whilst these 
results are consistent with those of Cebenoyan et al. (1993), Mester (1993), and others, in the 
analysis of non-bank financial institution efficiency, variance in samples and estimation techniques 
precludes valid comparison. 
The estimates detailed in Table 2 also appear reasonable in terms of statistical significance, and in 
satisfying the properties of parameters under neo-classical production theory. Care should be taken 
in the interpretation of an individual coefficient’s significance in that the inclusion of squared and 
interaction terms is likely to result in multicollinearity, thereby contributing to high standard errors. 
A more appropriate testing procedure is to simultaneously test the significance of groups of 
coefficients. Using the likelihood ratio testing procedure with an asymptomatic chi-square 
distribution a structural test of the restriction that all coefficients are zero is rejected, as is a similar 
null hypothesis that the nested Cobb-Douglas function is preferred to the translog. Finally, the own-
price elasticities for capital (-0.3167) and deposits (-0.0218) are found to be negative, with the 
cross-price elasticity (0.2347) indicating the substitutability of capital and deposits.  
TABLE 2. Translog cost function final maximum-likelihood estimates 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
CONST -5.7781** 2.3574 lnQ1Q2 0.0081* 0.0045 lnQ1P1 -0.0045 0.0050 
lnQ1 1.3105*** 0.5058 lnQ1Q3 0.0015 0.0021 lnQ1P2 0.0015 0.2023 
lnQ2 0.0086 0.3244 lnQ1Q4 -0.3808*** 0.0086 lnQ2P1 -0.0049* 0.0024 
lnQ3 -0.1184 0.1402 lnQ1Q5 0.0080 0.0083 lnQ2P2 0.0062 0.0051 
lnQ4 0.4125 0.6010 lnQ2Q3 0.0021** 0.0010 lnQ3P1 0.0021* 0.0010 
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lnQ5 -0.6029* 0.3630 lnQ2Q4 -0.0041 0.0042 lnQ3P2 -0.0042 0.0043 
lnP1 -0.0020 0.0004 lnQ2Q5 -0.0029 0.0051 lnQ4P1 0.1280** 0.0056 
lnP2 0.0029 0.7974 lnQ3Q4 -0.0050* 0.0025 lnQ4P2 0.1199 0.1781 
lnQ1Q1 0.0056 0.0043 lnQ3Q5 0.0011 0.0020 lnQ5P1 -0.0047 0.0045 
lnQ2Q2 -0.0004 0.0011 lnQ4Q5 0.3237*** 0.0077 lnQ5P2 -0.0085 0.1719 
lnQ3Q3 0.0009 0.0004 lnP1P1 -1.23E-04 1.96E-04 λ 0.4056  
lnQ4Q4 0.0098* 0.0056 lnP2P2 0.1451 0.1825 σ2U 0.0095  
lnQ5Q5 -0.1791*** 0.0065 lnP1P2 6.47E-04 4.47E-04 σ2V 0.0578  
Asterisk(s) denote significance: *, **, *** at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
The second stage of the estimation procedure involves regressing the predicted cost inefficiencies 
on a vector of explanatory variables. The Tobit regression coefficients derived from (4) are 
provided in Table 3. Whilst interpretation of the Tobit model is complicated by the fact that all 
computations are based on the normalised vector, hypothesis tests are possible using the 
transformed regression coefficients and the techniques found in Tobin’s original article. Using these 
techniques, of the variables selected to proxy operational characteristics, the level of assets Z1 and 
capital Z2 are significant and conform to the hypothesised sign. The signs of non-core revenue 
activities, both commercial loans Z3 and fee income Z4, do not support the hypothesised results, 
though fee income is significant. A Wald Chi-square statistic confirms the joint significance of total 
assets and capital on credit union cost efficiency at the ten percent level, as does an identical test for 
the revenue hypotheses. These results contrast with those of Cebenoyan et al. (1993, p. 164) who 
found that “...inefficiency differences across [thrift institutions] do not appear to be related to firm 
size” and affirm the results of Mester (1993, p. 282) such that “...better capitalised thrifts are more 
efficient”. 
In terms of organisational structure, both branches Z5 and agencies Z6 positively affect credit union 
inefficiency. From the results it would appear that both agency and branch networks are a relatively 
costly form of organisational structure - the presumed benefits of a branch network are outweighed 
by the inability of central offices to control costs and promote revenues. These results are similar to 
those found by Fried et al. (1993, p. 264) in a study of US credit unions, and Drake and Weyman-
Jones (1992) of UK building societies, where excessive branching behaviour implied a lower level 
of cost efficiency.  
TABLE 3. Tobit regression results 
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By far the most important determinant of credit union efficiency would appear to be the 
institutional framework in which they operate. In the first instance, the ‘bond’ under which a credit 
union is created has a lasting influence on its operations. As we have seen, industrial-based credit 
unions appear to suffer cost disadvantages due to limited membership pools and restricted intra-
industry diversification. In fact, this would appear to outweigh the negative cost differentials 
implied by their sponsor’s donated resources. Moreover, this would imply that economy-wide 
structural adjustment has the capacity to influence non-bank financial institution performance and, 
by implication, solvency. In the second instance, differentials in credit union efficiency still persist 
from state-based regulation. The Wald Chi-square tests support the joint significance of bond-type 
and state regulation on credit union cost efficiency at the ninety-nine and ninety-five percent level 
respectively. The significance of institutional and regulatory frameworks in determining thrift 
efficiency has been likewise observed by Cebenoyan et al. (1993) and Mester (1993) for US S&Ls, 
and Fried et al. (1993) for US credit unions. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A number of points emerge from the present study. Firstly, the stochastic cost frontier estimates 
indicate that Australian credit unions operated at a high level of cost efficiency in 1995. A typical 
Variable Normalised 
coefficient 
Standard error Regression 
coefficient 
Z1 -0.0.2267-05 0.1205-5 -0.5866-7* 
Z2 -1.1939 2.0707 -0.0308* 
Z3 0.6498 2.1812 0.0168 
Z4 4.4509 2.0769 0.1151** 
Z5 0.0183 0.0177 0.0004* 
Z6 0.0022 0.0047 0.5745-4* 
Z7 2.2485 0.4820 0.0581*** 
Z8 1.9394 0.4860 0.0502*** 
Z9 0.7398 0.4631 0.0191* 
Z10 0.6231 0.5088 0.0161 
Z11 0.4127 0.4998 0.0106 
Z12 0.4143 0.5678 0.1072 
Z13 1.1147 0.6500 0.0288* 
Z14 -0.6866 0.6535 -0.0177 
Z15 1.2547 1.1233 0.0324 
EFF 38.645 2.4099  
Asterisk(s) denote significance: *, **, *** at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
Log-likelihood: 287.743  
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credit union’s costs were only some seven percent above what could be considered necessary. The 
second part of this paper relates these inefficiency measures to several correlates. All other things 
being equal, a large, well-capitalised credit union with a small branch network will be more 
efficient. However, another important contributor to credit union efficiency (or inefficiency) is the 
state-based regulatory framework within which they operate. Several areas of concern to regulators 
are highlighted, not least the impact of disparate state regulation, and the implicit constraints placed 
on industrial-type credit unions. The relatively recent move to a federally-supervised, state-
regulated regime may help to mitigate some of these factors..  
There are at least three ways in which this research may be extended. First, it may be useful to 
obtain estimators of thrift (building society or credit union) efficiency using pooled time-series, 
cross-sectional data. This would not only provide consistent estimators of efficiency over time, but 
would also indicate improvements in efficiency due to deregulation and so on. A second extension 
would be to use nonparametric, nonstochastic techniques, such as data envelopment analysis, to 
evaluate thrift efficiency. It may well be that the imposition of a specific structural form, like that 
employed in the present context, is not appropriate in assessing the provision of financial services. 
Finally, similar techniques to the present study could be extended to alternative conceptualisations 
of financial institution behaviour. More particularly, where accurate data on account transactions 
and individual deposit characteristics could be obtained, a production approach may provide 
alternative criteria for assessing cost efficiency. The latter point highlights the necessity for 
accurate and consistent data being made available for research into non-bank financial institution 
efficiency. 
 
NOTES 
1  The existing literature uses the term X-(in)efficiency to describe all allocative and technical (in)efficiencies, as 
distinguished from scale and scope (in)efficiencies. The present paper adopts this approach. 
2  “Research to date suggests that X-inefficiencies account for on the order of 20% or more of costs in banking, while 
scale and product mix inefficiencies, when they can be accurately estimated, are usually found to account for less 
than 5% of costs (Berger, et al. 1993, p. 222). 
3  The credit union industry in Australia is unevenly distributed across the states and territories, with most credit 
unions (70% by number) concentrated in the most populous states of NSW and Victoria. A number of factors 
account for the late and uneven development of credit unions in Australia; the most notable being the post-war 
relaxation on the creation of credit unions by geographic bond only, and manifold state-based regulation.  
4  Prior to deregulation in the 1980s, the state-regulated credit unions primary advantage over the federally-regulated 
commercial banks was the latters limited access to the consumer credit market. Since then, and given 
recommendations that credit unions should be treated in the same manner as other financial intermediaries “on 
competitive neutrality and efficiency grounds”, their other primary advantage of concessional taxation has been 
eliminated. 
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5  Over 90 percent of Australian credit unions belong to the Credit Union Services Corporation (Australia) Limited 
(CUSCAL). This entity provides a diverse range of centralised services to its members, including liquidity 
management, central banking, ATM network access, computer services, and marketing. 
6  Australian credit unions may be created on the basis of a geographic (community or parish) or industrial 
(occupational) bond. Therefore, the decline of specific industrial sectors also poses challenges for the credit union 
industry. 
7  A recent survey identifies the biggest challenges facing Australian credit unions as: (i) the erosion of interest 
margins, (ii) cross-subsidisation of retail transactions, and (iii) high cost ratios. Moreover, most of the recent growth 
in new accounts (+ 3.3% for the 12-months to March 1996) has been in the ‘high transaction/low balance’ category 
(approximately 20% of all accounts). 
8  In a recent paper Fried et al. (1996) have analysed the ‘quality’ of management in a study of university-affiliated 
credit unions. 
9  The creation of the Australian Financial Institutions Commission (AFIC) in 1992 was intended to provide a state-
based, but nationally consistent regulatory framework for thrift institutions 
10  A fundamental limitation of the production approach is the exclusion of interest costs as determinants of financial 
institution behaviour - especially when such expenses “...typically comprise 70-80% of a financial institution’s 
operating costs (Esho and Sharpe, 1994, p. 260). A somewhat more prosaic limitation is the difficulties encountered 
in collating accurate production data (Colwell and Davis 1992, p. 112). The main drawbacks of the intermediation 
approach are the mix of stock (balance sheet) and flow (income statement) concepts, and the exclusion of services 
not proxied by balance sheet magnitudes. 
11  An alternative to incorporating branches in the second-stage regression is to include them as an input in the cost 
function itself. One issue that arises here is that such a procedure will calculate cost efficiencies at the level of the 
average office, rather than at the firm level [see, for instance, Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987) and Bauer et 
al. (1993)]. Moreover, the trend towards the centralisation of many branch operations has made the concept of 
individual branch efficiency somewhat inappropriate. 
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